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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3{2)(i) 
of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court improperly apply the law by determining home equity value when 
the matter was neither pleaded nor supported by evidence at trial 
The standard of appellate review is correction of error, Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 
1254, (Utah 1998). 
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it used and arbitrary, capricious and 
invalid method for determining home equity value resulting in an unfair award to defendant. 
The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion, (Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 
860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Plaintiff's Complaint, filed on or about September 29, 1999, sought the Court's 
determination of the parties' interest in a residence upon real property on three (3) separate 
bases: (a) dissolution of partnership and determination of partnership share; (b) quiet title 
on the basis on adverse possession; and f c) that defendant had no interest in said property 
and her name was on the Deed solely as an accommodation to plaintiff. (Record at pages 
1-6). 
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2. Defendant answered, admitted that the parties were in a partnership with 
respect to the real property and requested the Court to order the property sold and the equity 
divided equally between the parties. (Record at pages 7-8). 
3. A trial on the issues was held on June 6, 2000, and the Court entered Findings, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order Quieting Title July 31, 2000. (Record at pages 
52-56). 
4. Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Judgment August 9, 2000, (Record at 
pages 57-58). 
5. The Court issued an Order on defendant's Motion denying the same October 
12, 2000. (Record at pages 77-78). 
6. Defendant filed her Notice of Appeal October 19, 2000, from a final Order 
entered in the Fourth District Court, Utah County. (Record at pages 81-82). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
a. Plaintiff and defendant began living together in August of 1993 and lived 
together until October of 1996, at which time they separated. (Record at page 56, Findings, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 1). 
b. At first the parties lived with plaintiffs mother, but then in September of 1994, 
plaintiff and defendant signed as borrower and co-borrower for the purchase of the home 
located in American Fork, Utah, and lived together in this home until their separation. 
(Record at page 56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, 
paragraph 1). 
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c. The parties did not hold themselves out as husband and wife. (Record at page 
56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 1). 
d. The loan application for the purchase of the American Fork home indicated 
that the parties intended to purchase the property as joint tenants while listing themselves as 
unmarried persons. (Record at pages 55-56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 2). 
e. The parties took title to the property in their separate names as joint tenants. 
(Record at pages 55-56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting 
Title, paragraph 2). 
f. The total purchase price for the property was $58,395.26 and $6,995.26 was 
paid as a down payment leaving a total balance due of $51,296.75 (sic), (Record at pages 
55-56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 2). 
g. From the time of purchase of the property in September, 1994, until the end 
of October, 1996, the parties lived in the home together, pooling their incomes during the 
time that each was employed for the benefit of each other, and paying the monthly mortgage 
on the home, either from funds contained in a joint bank account or from defendant's 
separate bank account. (Record at page 55, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 3). 
h. Plaintiff and defendant, for purposes of purchasing the property in question, held 
themselves out as joint tenants, (Record at page 55, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 4). 
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i. The beginning loan balance due for the property was $51,296,75, and the balance 
owing on said loan as of October 31, 1996, the date of separation, was $50,135.78. The 
difference between the purchase price and the price at the time defendant left would be the 
equity established by payments made. (Record at pages 55 and unnumbered page, Findings, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 5). 
j . Neither party presented any evidence for the Court to consider with respect to 
appreciation and value of the property from the time of purchase to October 31, 1996, the 
time of separation, nor from the time of purchase to the time of trial. Record at page 
unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, 
paragraph 5). 
k. After the separation of the parties the plaintiff continued to reside in the home and 
pay the monthly mortgage payments, taxes and insurance. No monies were paid by the 
defendant from October 31, 1996, to the time of trial. Record at page unnumbered, Findings, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 7). 
1. The 1999 County Property Valuation notice submitted as Exhibit 12 showed a 
current valuation of $80,157.00. (Record at page unnumbered). 
m. The purchase price of the property was $51,296.75 as of September 14, 1994, and 
as of October 31, 1996, the time of separation of the parties, there was $50,135.78 due and 
owing on the property. (Record at page unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 8). 
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n. Equity in the property was determined by subtracting the mortgage balance on 
the date the parties separated from the original purchase price. (Record at page unnumbered, 
Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 6). 
0. Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of the equity in the property. 
(Record at page unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order 
Quieting Title, paragraph 9). 
p. The equity established in the property by evidence is $1,160.97, and defendant 
is entitled to $580.48 plus interest as her equity in the property. (Record at page 
unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, 
paragraphs 8 and 10). 
q. Title to the property is quieted in plaintiffs name against the defendant. 
(Record at page unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order 
Quieting Title, paragraph 11). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. It was improper for the trial court to determine the amount of the home's equity 
because that matter was not pleaded and neither party presented evidence sufficient to 
establish that matter. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion in determining the home's equity value when 
it used an arbitrary, capricious and invalid method. Because determination of equity in real 
property requires evidence of its fair market value, when such evidence is not presented, the 
trial court cannot create its own formula. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF 
THE HOME'S EQUITY: 
Plaintiffs Complaint asks the trial court to declare him the sole owner of the home 
owned in joint tenancy by the parties or, to determine what share each of the parties did own. 
Defendant's Answer also asks the trial court to determine the percentage of ownership owned 
by each of the parties. The trial court heard testimony and took evidence of the 
understanding, intent and actions of the parties with respect to ownership and determined 
that each owned half and was entitled to one-half of the equity therein. This part of the trial 
court's decision is not disputed on appeal. 
"Neither party presented any evidence for the Court to consider with respect to 
appreciation in value of the property from the time of purchase to October 31, 1996, the time 
of separation, nor from the time of purchase to time of trial." (Findings, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment and Order Quieting Title at paragraph 5 pages 55 and unnumbered page of the 
record). In fact neither party attempted to establish the home's fair market value at trial and 
neither party asked the trial court to award him/her a dollar amount for his/her share. Each 
of the parties was only asking the trial court to establish the percent share of ownership that 
each owned. 
It is improper for a trial court to make a ruling on a matter not pleaded and where the 
evidence is insufficient to establish that matter. In re: Behm's Estate. 213 P.2d 657, 663 
(Utah 1950). Because the trial court had no evidence to support a finding concerning the 
amount of the home's equity and because neither of the parties requested such a finding in 
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their pleadings or at trial, the trial court, as in the Behm's Estate case, was barred from 
making findings and conclusions on the matter of either fair market value or home equity. 
This portion of the judgment must be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE HOME'S 
EQUITY VALUE: 
With respect to real estate, equity is the difference between the fair market value of 
a property and the debt against that property. (See Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.). 
Although the trial court had evidence as to the debt that existed against the property three 
year's prior to the date of trial, it had no evidence as to the debt against the property as of 
the date of trial nor did it have any evidence of the property's fair market value. Rather than 
requiring the parties to produce or submit evidence of the property's fair market value or 
otherwise fashioning a remedy that would establish equity, the trial court created its own 
method of determining the home's equity. It used the mortgage balance as of the date of 
purchase and the mortgage balance as of the date of the parties' separation, neither of which 
is a measure of fair market value. This method of calculating home equity is arbitrary, 
capricious and an invalid formula for calculating home equity. 
Where there is inadequate evidence to apply a standard means and method of 
determining property value, the trial court should use proper discretion in devising how to 
bring the necessary evidence before it or otherwise divide the subject property rather than 
creating its own definition and formula. In the case ofMunnsv. Munns. 790 P.2d 116 (Utah 
App. 1990), when the trial court concluded that it did not have appropriate property values 
and that the valuation evidence was inadequate, it continued the hearing for presentation of 
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further appraisal information. In the case of Berger v. Berger. 713 P.2d 695, 698 (Utah 
1985) the trial court utilized inconclusive and improper evidence of a property's value. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had no admissible evidence as to the value of 
the property and remanded the case for a new trial to determine said property's value. 
The trial court in the present case, knowing that it had inadequate evidence of the 
property's value, had several options within its proper discretion. It could have (1) ordered 
the property sold and its net proceeds divided half to each party; (2) ordered that the parties 
hire one or more appraisers to value the property and allowed plaintiff to purchase 
defendant's one-half share if he did not want to sell the property; and (3) continued the trial 
and ordered the parties to stipulate or submit evidence of the property's value. Any of these 
approaches would have been fair and reasonable and would not have produced the 
inequitable outcome for defendant that has resulted from the trial court's improper 
determination of equity. 
The trial court knew that the property had appreciated in value and that it was no 
longer worth what the parties had originally paid for it because Exhibit "12" admitted at trial 
showed that the county valued the property at $80,157.00 in 1999. (This Exhibit was not 
before the court to establish the exact fair market value of the property but the court did have 
the Exhibit and the valuation of the property before it). There was no reasonable basis for 
the court to utilize the method of determining the home's equity as it did. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the improper finding and conclusion regarding the home's equity and 
the abuse of discretion in how that home equity value was determined, appellant requests this 
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Court to reverse the trial court's order granting her judgment against the plaintiff for the sum 
of $580.48 plus interest as representing her equity interest in the home and to remand the 
determination of home equity value to the trial court and require said court to make its 
determination on the basis of either appraisal or sale of the property. 
DATED May 21, 2001. 
Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this JjZJ?4' &ay of May, 2001, to the following: 
Ralph C. Amott 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Ste. 102 
Provo, UT 84606 
< ^ m / y s f r * ^ 
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ADDENDUM 
11 
99OCT-5 AH!!: 09 
RALPH C. AMOTT, (#0068) 
DONALD D. GILBERT (#6733) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 E 100 So., STE 102 
PROVO UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-6575 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 84601 
DAN F. LEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, 
and John Does 1-10, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
DIVISION # "7 
Civil No.99-0^035S£ 
COMES NOW plaintiff and complains of Defendants, and for cause 
of action alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Equitable dissolution and division of partnership property 
and/or judgment for contribution and payments of Plaintiff) 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Utah County, 
State of Utah. 
2. That the property that is the subject of this lawsuit is 
located in the City of American Fork, County of Utah, State of Utah 
and is more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING 132.0 FEET WEST OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
BLOCK 10, PLAT A, OF THE AMERICAN FORK CITY SURVEY OF 
BUILDING LOTS; THENCE NORTH 107.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 95.5 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 25.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 20.0 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 132.0 FEET TO THE NORTH LINE OF 100 SOUTH STREET; 
THENCE EAST 115.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
AREA: 0.30 ACRES. 
3. In 1994, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a 
partnership by becoming record owners of the subject property 
described above as unmarried individuals. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant cohabitated at the subject 
property from 1994 to November 1996. 
5. In November 1996, Defendant abandoned Plaintiff and the 
property, left the state for a period of time, and married, having 
no further contact with Plaintiff or the property. 
6. That Plaintiff has been paying the taxes, mortgage 
payments, costs of repair, maintenance and has made improvements on 
the subject property for each and every year since the acquisition 
in 1994 and resides there today. 
7. At no time since the acquisition in 1994 has Defendant 
made any contributions, or only nominal ones, towards payment of 
the mortgage, costs of repair, maintenance, improvements, insurance 
or taxes on the subject property. 
8. That Defendant has breached the partnership agreement by 
abandoning the premises and by failing to make contribution or 
reimbursing for the same and the partnership should therefore be 
dissolved and the property distributed to Plaintiff in its 
entirety. 
9. That Plaintiff has sought to refinance the subject 
property but Defendant's name on the property is a cloud thereon 
preventing refinance or sale and Defendant has refused and ignored 
requests to remove her name or assign over title or even to make an 
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15. Plaintiff has had actual, continuous possession and made 
open, exclusive and notorious use of the property for the last 
three (3) years. Said use has been under claim of right and/or 
title, adverse and hostile to any interest that Defendant may 
assert in the property. 
16. That based on Plaintifffs sole use of the property for 
many years, and Defendant's abandonment thereof, and her failure to 
contribute in any meaningful way to the purchase, maintenance, or 
upkeep of the property in question, and the fact that this is, and 
always was, simply what the parties considered a partnership or 
investment based on relative contribution to the purchase and 
upkeep of the property, and based on all other allegations 
heretofore set forth, that Plaintiff is entitled to an order 
Quieting Title to said property in Plaintiff, free and clear of any 
interest or claim of Defendant or any other person. 
17. That Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this quiet title 
action. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(ACCOMODATION) 
18. Plaintiff realleges all prior allegations set forth 
herein. 
19. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that the taking of 
this property in Defendant's name jointly with Plaintiff, was done 
solely as an accomodation to Plaintiff by Defendant. 
20. That defendant knew, or should have known, that she 
claimed no interest in this property and that her subsequent 
behavior after taking title jointly with Plaintiff attests to this 
understanding in that she made no contribution to the mortgage, 
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improvements, taxes or any other aspect of maintaining this home, 
that she abandoned the same after only a short time and has 
continuously abandoned it for many years. 
21. That equitably Plaintiff is entitled to all equity that 
has accrued in this home since its purchase based on his sole 
contributions thereto, and the fact that Defendant's taking joint 
title with him was a mere accomodation and intended by the parties 
to endow no interest or claim on the property in Defendant. 
22. That Plaintiff is entitled therefore to an order removing 
Defendant's name from this property and awarding it free and clear 
to Plaintiff, plus an award of costs and fees in incurred in 
prosecuting this action. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant 
Branin, and all other John Does as may be identified and added 
hereafter, as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
1. For an order of this court dissolving the partnerhsip of 
the parties, to an accounting and determination of all partnership 
proceeds and contributions, and to an order determining the 
relative equitable value of each parties contribution to the 
investment property, which Plaintiff believes should be a finding 
of 100% interest in the property to Plaintiff and 0% to Defendant. 
2. For an order of this court removing Defendant's name from 
the property and awarding free and clear title to him, or in the 
alternative granting Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant for all 
contributions, payments, improvements and such as he has made on 
this property, all as may be proven at trial. 
5 
3. For an order that Defendant, and all persons or John Does 
claiming interest with Defendant, have no estate, right, title, 
lien or interest in or to the property or any part thereof, and 
Plaintiff's interest is superior to all others. 
4. For an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
1. For an Order of this Court quieting title to the subject 
property in Plaintiff solely. 
2. For an order that Defendant, and all persons or John Does 
claiming interest with Defendant, have no estate, right, title, 
lien or interest in or to the property or any part thereof, and 
Plaintiff's interest is superior to all others» 
3. For an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
1. For an Order of this court that Plaintiff is entitled to 
an order removing Defendant's name from this property ae being 
solely an accomodation signer, and awarding it free and clear to 
Plaintiff, plus an award of costs and fees in incurred in 
prosecuting this action. 
DATED this JI day of September, 1999. 
Ralplv^t.Amott, 
Donald D. Gilbert, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Howard Chuntz, No 4208 
Attorney for Defendant 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Telephone: 801-222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
DAN F. LEE, ANSWER 
Plaintiff, 
v. Case No. f ^ ' / ^ g ^ / " 
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendant. 
/ 
COMES NOW defendant, Dora Sanders, by and through her attorney, Howard Chuntz, 
and answers the allegations set forth in plaintiffs Complaint as follows: 
1. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
2. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 21 and 22 of plaintiffs Complaint. 
3. With respect to paragraph 5 of plaintiff s Complaint, defendant admits that she and 
plaintiff separated, that she began living separately from him, that she allowed him to remain in 
their home that is the subject of this litigation, that she left the State for a period of time and 
married, but denies that she abandoned the subject property. 
4. With respect to paragraph 9 of plaintiff s Complaint, defendant admits that her name 
remains as an owner on said property and that the same may be preventing defendant from 
refinancing or selling said property and that she has refused request to remove her name or assign 
over title of the property to plaintiff, but denies each and every other allegation set forth therein. 
5. With respect to paragraph 10 of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant admits that any 
partnership that exists between the parties should be dissolved, that the subject property should be 
sold and that the equity derived therefrom should be divided between the parties. Defendant 
denies each and every other allegation set forth therein. 
6. With respect to paragraph 12 of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant is without sufficient 
knowledge or information to form an opinion or belief, and, therefore, denies the same. 
7. With respect to paragraph 15 of plaintiff s Complaint, defendant admits that plaintiff 
has had actual and continuance possession of the subject premises and has made open, exclusive 
and notorious use of said property for the last two plus years, but denies each and every other 
allegation set forth in said paragraph 15. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiff take nothing by his Complaint, that the 
Court order that the property be sold and that the equity therein be divided equally between the 
parties and that defendant be awarded her costs and attorney's fees in defending this action. 
DATED October 18, 1999. 
/ / 
/Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Defendant ' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this - C ^ d a y of October, 1999, to the following: 
Ralph C. Amott 
Donald D. Gilbert 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Ste. 102 
Provo, UT 84606 
reans ?k A7j:-, 
>y 
RALPH C. AMOTT (#68) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 377-6575 JUL 3 I A 17 Fii 'CO 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 84601 
DAN F. LEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, 
and John Does 1-10, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND JUDGMENT and 
ORDER QUIETING TITLE 
Civil No.9904-03528 
THIS MATTER CAME on regularly before this court for bench 
trial on June 6, 2000. Plaintiff was present in person and by 
and through his attorney's Ralph C.Amott and Donald D. Gilbert. 
Defendant was present in person and by and through her attorney 
Howard Chuntz. At issue were property claims arising from the 
joint purchase and maintenance of a home by Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The Court having received evidence and testimony and 
heard arguments in the case, and having reviewed the case law 
presented and all documentation on file with the Court, the Court 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
1. The Court finds that Plaintiff (Dan Lee), and Defendant 
(Dora Sanders), began living together in August of 1993. The 
Parties lived together until October 1996 when defendant and Mr. 
Lee separated. During that intervening time period the Parties 
lived with Plaintiff's mother and in the home purchased by the 
parties, though they did not hold themselves out as husband and 
wife. 
2. The Court finds that on September 14, 1994 Plaintiff and 
Defendant signed as borrower and co-borrower for the purchase of 
the home located in American Fork. The loan application (ex. 
22), indicated that the parties —listing themselves as unmarried 
persons— intended to purchase the property as joint tenants. 
Exhibit 23, a copy of a document entitled "Settlement Statement," 
lists the parties as borrowers for the property in quesion. The 
settlement statement indicates that the purchase price of the 
property was $56,000+ costs,, totaling $58,395.26. The evidence 
(ex.23), in the case established that the parties made a down 
payment of $6,995.26, leaving a total balance due of $51,296.75. 
No part of the down payment was paid by the Defendant. 
3. The Court finds from the time of purchase of the 
property in September 1994 until the end of October in 1996, the 
parties lived in the home together, pooling their incomes during 
the time that each was employed for the benefit of each other, 
and paying the monthly mortgage on the home, either from funds 
contained in a joint bank account or from Defendant's separate 
bank account. 
4. The Court finds that regardless of what labels are put 
on the theory of recovery, as claimed in this case by the 
Parties, i.e., contract, partnership or quasi-marital 
relationship, the court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant 
for purpose of purchasing the property in question held 
themselves out as joint tenants purchasing the property together. 
The Court finds the evidence (ex. 26 copies of Defendant's 
checks), established that many of the monthly mortgage payments 
were in excess of the required monthly amount. From the evidence 
presented, the regular monthly mortgage payment appears to be 
approximately $471.00 per month. 
5. The Court finds that as per exhibit 23, the beginning 
balance of the amount due for the purchase of the property was 
$51,296.75. The evidence shows from ex. 16 that as of October 
31, 1996, the balance due was $50,135.78. The difference between 
the purchase price and the price at the time Defendant left would 
be the equity established by payments made. Neither Party 
presented any evidence for the Court to consider with respect to 
appreciation in value of the property from the time of purchase 
to October 31, 1996, the time of separation, nor from the time of 
purchase to the time of trial. 
6. The Court finds the only way the Court has of 
determining any equity in the property that is subject to 
distribution is to determine the purchase price and compare it to 
the balance due on a specific date, namely the separation of the 
parties. 
7. Based upon the evidence, the Court finds that after the 
time of separation the Plaintiff continued to reside in the home 
and pay the monthly mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance. No 
moneys were paid by the Defendant from October 31, 1996 to the 
time of trial. 
8. From the evidence presented, the Court finds that as per 
exhibit 23 the purchase price of the property was $51,296.75 as 
of Setpember 14, 1994. The Court also finds that from exhibit 
16, as of October 31, 1996, the time of separation of the 
Parties, $50,135.78 was due and owing on the property. 
Subtracting that amount from the original purchase price, the 
Court finds that the equity established in the property by the 
evidence is $1,160.97. 
9. Considering the evidence, the Court finds that based 
upon principles of equity (Utah Code Ann. Sea. 30-2-6 (1999)), 
and partnership, the Parties, though unmarried (UCA Sec. 30-1-
4.5), should share equally in the amount of equity found by the 
Court. Therefore, the Court divides the $1,160.97 equally. 
10. Defendant is entitled to $580.48 plus interest as her 
equity in the property. 
11. The Court finds that title is quieted to Plaintiff 
against the Defendant and that an order may be entered removing 
the Defendant's name from the property. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE 
COURT DOES NOW MAKE THE FOLLOWING ORDER OF JUDGMENT AND QUIET 
TITLE: 
1. Defendant is granted judgment against Plaintiff in the 
sum of $580.48 plus interest of 10% from October 1996 until paid 
in full, representing her equity interest in the home in American 
Fork. 
2. Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant her interest as set 
forth in paragraph one immediately above on or before September 
30, 2000. In the event the amount has not been paid by that 
date, the home shall be placed for sale with a real estate 
company and sold and Defendant paid her $580.48 plus interest 
from the proceeds of the sale. 
3. The home and property in American Fork is hereby quieted 
in Plaintiff Dan Lee and by this order the name of Defendant Dora 
Sanders aka Dora Branin is hereby removed from the title to said 
property located at 22 West 100 South, American Fork, Utah, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
COMMENCING 132.0 FEET WEST OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
BLOCK 10 PLAT "A", OF THE AMERICAN FORK CITY SURVEY OF 
BUILDING LOTS; THENCE NORTH 107.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 95.5 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 25.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 20.0 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 132.0 FEET TO THE NORTH LINE OF 100 SOUTH STREET; 
THENCE EAST 115.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
4. Each party shall bear their own attorney fees and costs 
in this matter. 
Dated this *£ I day of Qi\r^L^^ / 2000, 
BY THE COURT: 0%-
Approved as to Form: / 
/ 
Howard Chunt^; Atty. for Def, 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order 
Quieting Title was mailed, postage prepaid, this / day of 
July, 2000, to the following: 
Howard Chuntz, Attorney 
1149 West Center 
Orem, Utah, 84057 
-> r n-< tr . I T 
Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Defendant 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Telephone: 801-222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
DAN F. LEE, 
MOTION TO AMEND 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT 
v. 
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, Case No. 9904-03528 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, TV -\ 
Vi l / J 
Defendant. 
/ 
COMES NOW defendant in the above captioned matter, by and through her attorney, 
Howard Chuntz, and moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to amend its Judgment. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities submitted herewith. 
Howard Chuntz 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY/CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ^ 7 day of August, 2000, to the following: 
Ralph C. Amott 
Donald D. Gilbert 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Ste. 102 
Provo, UT 84606 
re mot 
RALPH C. AMOTT (#68) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 377-6575 
n ,,rth a "lina; Disirtct U>urt 
Fourth 4^™ %<*?,•$ Utah 
of Utaii County ^f-y 
Oeputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 84601 
DAN F. LEE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, 
and John Does 1-10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEENDANT'S MOTION 
Civil No.9904-03528 
D;V7 
THIS MATTER came on regularly before this court for ruling 
on Defendants Motion to Amend Judgment. Plaintiff filed an 
Objection thereto. The court having reviewed all the pleadings 
before it, and duly considered the same, and having heretofore 
entered itfs ruling dated Sept. 21, 2000, and good cause 
otherwise appearing; Now Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The main issue raised in Defendant's Motion to Amend is 
that the court erred in determining the equity in the property 
and that the correct way to determine it is to subtract all debt 
and encumbrance balances from the property1s actual or appraised 
value. Thus, Defendant argues that the Court should have either 
(1) ordered that the property be sold with Plaintiff having a 
right of first refusal, and the purchase price less the mortgage 
balance to be divided equally between the parties; or (2) order 
the parties to have the property appraised, and determine equity 
as described above. The Court agrees that these methods are some 
options available to determine equity in real property. However, 
the Court believes, based on the evidence presented at trial, 
that the Court's determination of equity was appropriate. 
2. By both parties admission, neither party presented 
evidence of the property's actual or appraised value at trial. 
However, both the plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's Answer 
put at issue the value of the real property at issue in the 
lawsuit. Thus, both parties were on notice by reason of the 
pleadings that the value of the real property and its equity 
would be questions to be addresed at the time of trial. 
Based upon the evidence presented by the parties at trial, a 
determination was made by the Court as to equity as stated in the 
Court's Ruling and above also. Therefore, in accordance with 
that evidence, the Court's determination was proper and equitable 
and will stand. 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment and Request for Oral 
Argument are therefore and hereby DENIED. 
DATED this /'Kday of October, 2000. 
BY^HE COURT: 
/i 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order on Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment, was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this J1^ day of - ^ c / ^ , 2000, to Howard 
Chuntz, Attorney for Defendant, at 1149 West Center, Orem, Utah, 
84057. 
OCT ZU 
Howard Chuntz, No. 4208 
Attorney for Defendant 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Telephone: 801-222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
DAN F.LEE, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Case No. 9904-03528 
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendant. 
/ 
Defendant, Dora Sanders, aka Dora Branin, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from the Judgment and Order Quieting Title entered by the Honorable Gary D. Stott on July 31, 
2000, from plaintiffs Complaint. 
DATED October 10, 2000. 
Howard Chuntz j 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this /fty/day of October, 2000, to the following: 
Ralph C. Amott 
Donald D. Gilbert 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East 100 South, Ste. 102 
Provo, UT 84606 / ' 
re not ^ 3 & /j?fa\.tf -*^^ 
1999 PROPERTY VALUATION JNOllUb 
AUGUST 20 , 1999 
- THIS IS NOT A BILL - DO NOT PAY -
)PERTY IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION PROPERTY LOCATION INFORMATION 
S T 060 (C ) 
# 02:023:0003 
# C-158 
RS COM. W 132 FT FR SE COR OF BLK 10, PLAT A, AMERICAN FORK CIT 
(001) Y SURVEY; N 107 FT; W 95-5 FT; N 25 FT; W 20 FT; S 132 FT; E 
115.5 FT TO BEG. AREA .30 ACRES. 
LEE, DAN F ET AL 
22 W 100 S 
AMERICAN FORK UT 84003-2302 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION INFORMATION 
IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THIS YEAR'S MARKET 1 
VALUE AND WANT TO FILE AN APPEAL, YOU MUST 
CALL 370-8228 BEFORE SEP 20 AT 5:00 P.M. AND 
PROVIDE THE SERIAL NUMBER OF THE PROPERTY 
WHOSE VALUE YOU WISH TO APPEAL. NO 
APPEALS WILL BE ALLOWED AFTER THIS DATE. AN 
APPLICATION WILL THEN BE SENT TO YOU. THE 
COMPLETED APPLICATION, TOGETHER WITH ALL 
DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING THE VALUE YOU 
THINK IS APPROPRIATE MUST BE EITHER 
RECEIVED BY THE CLERK OF THE BOARD AT 1 
100 E CENTER, SUITE 3600, PROVO, UT 84606, 1 
BEFORE THE HEARING, OR BROUGHT WITH YOU 
TO YOUR HEARING. 
MARKET VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY 
PROPERTY TYPE 
DENT!AL 
TOTAL PROPERTY VALUE 
LAST YEARS MARKET VALUE 
70 ,935 
70 ,935 
THIS YEARS MARKET VALUE 
80 ,157 
80 ,157 
CURRENT AND PROPOSED PROPERTY TAXES | 
TAXING ENTITIES 
NE SCHOOL DIST (BASIC) 
NE SCHOOL DIST (OTHER) 
ICAN FORK CITY 
L ASSESSING 
i COUNTY ASSESSING 
COUNTY 
RAL UT WATER CONS DIST 
H UTAH CNTY WATER DIST 
NE SCHOOL DIST JDGMENT 
ICAN FORK CITY JDGMENT 
L ASSESSING JUDGEMENT 
TOTAL PROPERTY TAX 
TAX 
LAST YEAR 
7 1 . 7 9 
176.38 
9 4 . 5 3 
6 .91 
8 .90 
49 .^7 
15.^9 
1.68 
1.91 
I . 8 3 
• 35 
4 2 9 . 2 3 
TAX THIS YEAR IF . 
NO CHANGE 
8 1 . 1 2 
191.42 
9 9 . 3 3 
8 . 5 5 
9 . 8 3 
5 3 . 1 7 
17 .63 
1.76 
4 6 2 . 8 2 
PROPOSED BUDGET 
81 .12 
226 .25 
99-33 
8 .55 
0 0 0 
53 .17 
17.63 
1.76 
^97.65 
A PUBLIC BUDGET 
MEETING WILL BE HELD: 
SEPT 14TH AT 7:00 PM 
575 N. 100 E. AMER FRK 
PLEASE READ OTHER SIDE 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
The Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI, 1791. 
76-6-405. Theft by deception 
(1)A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2)Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to 
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated 
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a 
class or group. 
Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
76-6-501. Forgery- "Writing" defined 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a)alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, eecutes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have 
been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact 
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, 
and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a 
government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or 
claim against any person or enterprise. 
(d) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
77-32-101. Indigent Defense Act. 
This chapter is known as the "Indigent Defense Act." 
Utah Code 
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
77-32-301. Minimum standards for defense of an indigent. 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in crin i 
cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in accordance 
with the following minimum standards: 
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of 
the deprivation of the indigent's liberty; 
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; 
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and 
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by 
defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 354, 1997 General Session 
Utah Code 
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
77-32-302. Assignment of counsel on request of indigent or order of court. 
(1) Legal counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent and the indigent 
shall also be provided access to defense resources necessary for an effective 
defense, if the indigent is under arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is 
a substantial probability that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail 
or prison if: 
(a) the indigent requests counsel or defense resources, or both; or 
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise orders counsel, defense 
resources, or both and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject on the 
record the opportunity to be represented and provided defense resources. 
(2) (a) If a county responsible for providing indigent legal defense, including 
counsel and defense resources, has established a county legal defender's office and 
the court has received notice of the establishment of the office, the court shall 
assign to the county legal defender's office the responsibility to defend indigent 
defendants within the county and provide defense resources. 
(b) If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal defense 
of an indigent, including defense resources and counsel, has arranged by contract 
to provide those services through a legal aid association, and the court has received 
notice or a copy of the contract, the court shall assign the legal aid association 
named in the contract to defend the indigent and provide defense resources. 
(c) If the county or municipality responsible for providing indigent legal 
defense, including counsel and defense resources, has contracted to provide those 
services through individual attorneys, individual defense resources, or associations 
providing defense resources, and the court has received notice or a copy of the 
contracts, the court shall assign a contracting attorney as the legal counsel to 
represent an indigent and a contracted defense resource to provide defense-related 
services. 
(d) If no county legal defender's office exists, the court shall select and 
assign an attorney or defense resource if: 
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is with multiple attorneys or 
resources; or 
(ii) the contract is with another attorney in the event of a conflict of 
interest. 
(e) If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney or 
defense resource to provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the 
existence of an indigent legal services contract and the court has a copy or notice 
of the contract, before the court may make the assignment, it shall: 
(i) set the matter for a hearing; 
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible 
county or municipality; and 
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a 
noncontracting attorney or defense resource. 
(f) The indigent's preference for other counsel or defense resources may not 
be considered a compelling reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting 
attorney or defense resource. 
(3) The court may make a determination of indigency at any time. 
Amended by Chapter 49, 2006 General Session 
Utah Code 
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
77-32-303. Standard for court to appoint noncontracting attorney or defense 
resource — Hearing. 
If a county or municipality has contracted for, or otherwise made 
arrangements for, the legal defense of indigents, including a competent attorney 
and defense resources, the court may not appoint a noncontracting attorney or 
resource either under this part, Section 78B-1-151, or Rule 15, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, unless the court: 
(1) conducts a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to consider 
the authorization or designation of a noncontract attorney or resource; and 
(2) makes a finding that there is a compelling reason to authorize or designate a 
noncontracting attorney or resources for the indigent defendant. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session. 
Utah Code 
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation. 
Rule 1.3. Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client. 
Comment 
...[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than 
procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage 
of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer 
overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even 
when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable 
delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's 
trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does 
not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement 
that will not prejudice the lawyer's client. 
Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation. 
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a 
client if: 
...(b)(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the 
lawyer or as been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; ... 
Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation. 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the 
interests of the client. 
Comment 
[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although 
there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for 
personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation 
solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be 
reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to 
obtain rightful redress or repose. The standard is whether a competent lawyer 
acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial 
purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise 
improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client. 
Rule 6.1. Voluntary Pro Bono Legal Service. 
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those 
unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono 
publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: 
...(c) A lawyer may also discharge the responsibility to provide pro bono publico 
legal services by making an annual contribution of at least $10 per hour for each 
hour not provided under paragraph (a) or (b) above to an agency that provides 
direct services as defined in paragraph (a) above. 
Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments. 
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person 
except for good cause, such as: 
...(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden 
on the lawyer; or 
Excerpts from Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, Chapter 13, 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation 
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation. 
Rule 1.3. Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. 
Comment 
...[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. 
A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change 
of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, 
the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not 
affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety 
and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with 
reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a 
reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client. 
Rule 1.14. Client with Diminished Capacity. 
...(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at 
risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot 
adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary 
protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to 
take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian. 
Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation. 
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client 
if: 
...(b)(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer 
or as been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; ... 
Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation. 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests 
of the client. 
Comment 
[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there 
will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal 
reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the 
convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the 
purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. 
The standard is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course 
of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or 
other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of 
the client. 
Rule 6.1. Voluntary Pro Bono Legal Service. 
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable 
to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal 
services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: 
...(c) A lawyer may also discharge the responsibility to provide pro bono publico legal 
services by making an annual contribution of at least $10 per hour for each hour not 
provided under paragraph (a) or (b) above to an agency that provides direct services as 
defined in paragraph (a) above. 
Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments. 
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except 
for good cause, such as: 
...(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the 
lawyer; or 
Excerpts from Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, Chapter 13, Rules 
of Professional Conduct 
